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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF
APPELLEE

TYLER D. BOYCE,
Petitioner and Appellee
-vs-

Case No. 990641-CA

TAMMY L. GOBLE,

Priority 15

Respondent and Appellant.

Appellee, Tyler D. Boyce, hereinafter "Petitioner" submits the following brief:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1998).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Appellant correctly marshal the evidence for this appeal?

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that there existed a

substantial change in circumstances to modify child support in this case?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in modifying child support on the facts

of this case?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must review the trial court' s interpretation of the child support guidelines
for correctness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation. Utah Sign,
Inc. v. Utah Dept of Transp., 896 P.2d 632 (Utah 1995). In reviewing child support
proceedings generally, the appellate courts accord substantial deference to the trial court's
findings and should not disturb its actions, absent manifest injustice or inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d393 (Utah 1985).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Petitioner sets forth in the attached Addendum, the complete code provisions
referenced in this brief as follows:
1.

§78-45-2(10) Utah Code Annotated (Definition of Joint Physical Custody)

2.

§78-45-7.2 Utah Code Annotated (Application of Guidelines)

3.

§78-45-8 Utah Code Annotated (Continuing Jurisdiction)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a final order of the Second Judicial District Court, in and for
Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, presiding.
The parties in this action were divorced by Decree of Divorce entered in the Second
Judicial District Court on or about November 25, 1997. That Decree awarded the parties
joint legal and physical custody of their three minor children and awarded Petitioner "equal
control and input into the children's lives" and "liberal rights of visitation." These vague
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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findings, the Court ruled that child support in this case should be based on a joint physical
custody worksheet.
The trial on the Petition for Modification was held July 13, 1998 before the
Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
New Trial under Rule 59, the matter was briefed and a hearing held April 20, 1999 before
the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. That motion was denied and the Order and
transcript of the ruling well explains the overall findings of the trial court in this matter and
is included in the Addendum. Respondent then filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment which
was denied and this Notice of Appeal was filed on or about July 22, 1999.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner submits the following statement of relevant facts:
1.

These parties were divorced by Decree entered November 25, 1997.

2.

The Decree awarded the parties joint legal andjoint physical custody of their

three minor children and awarded Petitioner "equal control and input into the children's
lives" and "liberal rights of visitation."
3.

Petitioner, Tyler Boyce filed a Petition for Modification on or about

August 4, 1997 seeking clarification and changes to the Decree concerning visitation and
child support. He alleged that since the Decree, he generally had visitation from Friday
evening until Monday morning on alternate weeks, a weekly midweek and 4 to 6 weeks in
the summer.
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custody" with the language vague as to liberal visitation, more than standard. Further, that
the record of visitation as of 1997 is that Petitioner had the children 38% of the time . . .
(b)

The Court found that it was the testimony of both parties that if the

liberal visitation resulted in Petitioner having similar expenses to Respondent, that would
represent an unanticipated change of circumstances and the Court made this finding. The
Court then held, that the child support should be calculated by using a joint custody
worksheet.
(c)

For purposes of child support calculation on a joint custody basis, the

Court found the parties' incomes to be $3,279 gross per month for Petitioner and found that
Respondent was not working and that she should have zero income imputed to her. This
resulted in a support amount for three children under a joint custody calculation of $563
per month.
10.

On November 6, 1998, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration or

New Trial based on Rule 59(c) URCP.
11.

A hearing was held on that Motion on April 29, 1999 before the Honorable

Jon M. Memmott presiding and the Motion was denied. A copy of the Order on Motion
for Reconsideration or New Trial and the transcript of this ruling is appended to this brief
in the Addendum.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence for this Appeal. The

appellate court cannot determine whether findings are erroneous or whether the exercise
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of trial court discretion was proper, unless the Appellant properly marshals evidence. This
Court has defined the marshaling requirement as requiring the Appellant to cite "every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" that supports the trial court's findings.
West Valley City vs. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is
also evident that what facts the Appellant does include are one-sided and are selective facts
favorable to Respondent's position, rather than properly marshaled evidence.
2.

The trial court understood and applied the correct legal standard for

modification of child support. The Appellant asserts that the trial court confused the
modification standard for child custody and the standard for child support. This is not the
case. In fact, the Court adopted the schedule of liberal visitation mediated by the parties
and calculated the percent of time sharing. The Court concluded that support be calculated
using a joint physical custody worksheet. This was a correct result under the support
guidelines and recent case law. Udy v. Udy 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard for Modification of Child Support
(a)

Standard of Utah Law for Support Modification

The calculation of child support pursuant to fixed guidelines has been in
place since July 1,1989 and is codified in the Uniform Civil Liabilityfor Support Act, UCA
§78-45-1 et seq. It is specifically stated that a court a shall "retain jurisdiction to modify
or vacate the order of support where justice requires." UCA §78-45-8. See, Addendum.
The main provisions for modification of the support guidelines are contained at UCA §78-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45-7.2(6) and (7). For purposes of this appeal, the subparagraph (7)(a) is applicable and
provides that "a parent may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of child
support if there has been a substantial change in circumstances." For purposes of that
subsection, the statute provides examples for what a substantial change in circumstances
may include such as:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

material changes in custody;
material changes in the relative well or assets of the parties;
material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the
support of others

The statute also references the need for the court to determine the best
interests of the child in a modification proceeding in the following terms:
Upon receiving a petition under subsection (7)a, the court
shall, taking into account the best interest of the child,
determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it has,
the court shall then determine whether the change results in a
difference of 15% or more between the amount of child
support ordered the amount that would be required under the
guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is
not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of
child support ordered to that which is provided for in the
guidelines. UCA §78-45-7.2 (7)(c).
Arguably, if the support in a case was not to be determined under the
guidelines, the court must refer to common law to determine if a substantial change of
circumstances warranting modification of child support exists. Harrison v. Harrison 450
P.2d 456 (Utah 1969).
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(b)

Was the Standard Applied Correctly to the Present Case?

The Respondent alleges that the trial court herein confused the different
standards for modifications of divorce orders. She references the modification standard of
custody at UCA §30-3-10.4(l)(a) which outlines a basis for substantial changed
circumstances as a custody decree becoming "unworkable or inappropriate under the
circumstances." Respondent then leaps to the conclusion that the court in this case found
an unworkable custody decree and on that basis, changed child support. There is no
evidence that the trial court misunderstood the standard and no evidence that a wrong
standard was applied in this case. In fact, quite the contrary is established on the record of
proceedings.
The court's reasoning in this area is well expressed in the hearing which took
place on the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, April 20,1999. A transcript of this
ruling is included in the Addendum herein where the trial judge states:
ff

. . . that they had agreed to joint physical and legal custody.
That they had not been able to implement the visitation
schedule. That the Court found a change of circumstances in
the implementation of the visitation schedule." Addendum at
A-7.
It is clear that both parties in this case were dissatisfied with the reality of the joint legal
and joint physical custody situation. The original decree was extremely brief and contained
no detail on how that agreement was to work. Importantly, however, the parties never had
much disagreement on the actual amount of time that Petitioner, Mr. Boyce was to spend
with his children. In his petition, he alleged that he generally had the children Friday night
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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until Monday morning alternate weeks, and one additional midweek overnight, and six
weeks in the summer. The parties attended mediation to resolve the petitions to modify and
ended up with essentially this same schedule, but on a clear calendar rotation. This
schedule was not in dispute at the time of trial and had already been ratified in a court order
arising from an appearance before the Commissioner.
Thus, the primary issue at the time of trial was whether the child support
being paid by Petitioner at the time of Decree should be adjusted. As the trial court clearly
stated in the above-quote, it is the application of the changed custody terms that resulted
in the most clear substantial material change in circumstances in this case. The trial court
for the first time in the divorce case, quantified the amount of visitation into percentage
terms finding that Petitioner had the children in his care 35.5% of the time and Respondent
had the children 64.5%. Based on these percentages, the trial court simply applied the law.
This law is well defined in the statutes contained at UCA §78-45-2(10) which defines joint
physical custody as a child staying with a parent "overnight for more than 25% of the year"
and both parents contributing to the expenses of the child in addition to child support.
Addendum at A-l. The court took evidence on the issue of what expenses were paid
directly by Petitioner for the benefit of the children. The court was persuaded that there
were substantial direct payments being made for the benefit of the children in addition to
the child support paid to Respondent. The court also made the additional finding that the
level of expenses was quite high and that both parties testified that this high level of
expenses in fact not contemplated and was unforeseeable at the time of the Decree.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent thus confuses the issue by claiming that the trial court applied
a custody modification standard to the child support change in this case. That is simply not
true. The trial court's finding of changed circumstances for support resulting from
application of the newly defined visitation schedule is exactly within the purview of the
statute at UCA §78-45-7.2(7)(b)(i) which references a "material change in custody" as a
statutory basis for changing child support. The parties simply had not quantified the vague
terms of liberal visitation set forth in their Decree before the modification trial. When that
quantification took place, the parties clearly made a material change which required use of
a joint custody worksheet. Although Respondent may complain that the visitation change
in this case was a very small change, that is beside the point. There is a clear statutory
directive that when overnights reach the level of 25% of the year, then child support will
be calculated pursuant to a joint physical worksheet. Thus, if visitation had been a total of
24% before a change and 25% after, then that 1% of change would absolutely result in a
child support change under the application of the guidelines. It appears to be Respondent
who is confused about the relationship of the custody modification procedures and not the
trial court. The Respondent references the Hogge v. Hogge, standard as requiring a
bifurcated procedure for changing child support. See Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah
1982). That case has nothing to do with child support modification and the circumstances
at bar. Because we have a specific test, that is a visitation order which meets 25% of the
overnights, there is no need to apply any other threshold test, rather the requirement to use
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the joint worksheet is automatic. Where the legislature has spoken so clearly in a statute,
it would be error for the court not to follow that mandate.
(c)

The Case Law Supports the Trial Court Ruling and Has Not Been
Distinguished.

At Ihe time of trial, the Petitioner pointed out to the court the controlling case
law in this area set forth in the Court of Appeals decision of Udy v. Udy 893 P.2d 1097
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Respondent does not even address this opinion in her brief. This
case held that labels of custody such as sole or joint do not control the child support
determination, rather, a trial court is required to follow the actual timesharing ordered in
a case and to determine from that which worksheet to use. There is nothing in the case
before the court that would take it out of the application of the Udy principle.
There have now been additional decisions on the same point which merely
emphasize the correctness of the trial court's ruling herein. The case ofRehn v. Rehn, 91A
P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999) has very similar facts to the present case. That was an appeal
of a case where the parties stipulated to child support pursuant to the guidelines and the
father received visitation which clearly exceeded 25% of the nights in the year. The trial
court made the support calculation on a sole custody worksheet and the appeal followed.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the stipulation of the parties was apparently
only to use the child support guidelines and not to use of a sole custody worksheet. Based
on the visitation award, the trial court was "required to follow the mandate of Utah's child
support guidelines and use a 'joint custody child support worksheet' or make findings of
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fact justifying its deviation." Citing Udy, 893 P.2d @ 1100. Certainly, if a trial court
intends to deviate from strict application of the guidelines and finds such guidelines to be
rebutted, it must set forth clear reasons to do so.
There is no question that this line of cases represents the controlling law in
this area and Respondent has put forth no evidence to distinguish this case from a strict
application of the support guidelines which require use of a joint physical custody
worksheet. For that reason, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed in all respects.
II.

The Findings of the Trial Court to Modify Support Herein Were Legally
Sufficient
The Respondent attacks the findings of the trial court and provides a series

of case references. What Respondent fails to do however, is to state any specific factual
finding that was omitted by the trial court and which was essential to the matter.
The findings of the trial court are stated in the most detail in the order on
Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and in the transcript of the court's ruling on that
Motion. Addendum at A-6 and A-15. In those documents, it is clearly stated that the
parties stipulated at the outset of trial to joint legal and joint physical custody and to liberal
visitation. The only required findings of the trial court were thus to quantify the visitation
schedule which the court did, finding that Respondent had the children 63% of the time and
the Petitioner had the children 37% of the time. The court then made a clear and correct
legal conclusion from those percentages of time sharing, that the joint physical custody
worksheet must be used to determine support in this case. Additionally, the court had to
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make findings on income to apply the support formula and the court made clear and
specific findings of the parties' incomes and changes since the time of Decree. After
hearing the evidence, the court sua sponte, deemed that zero income should be imputed to
Respondent for purposes of calculating support as since the time of the divorce, she had
remarried, had another child and was staying home and not working as a school teacher for
the time being. See, Paragraph 3, Order on Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial,
Addendum at A-16.
In the transcript of the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration and in that Order,
the court clarified the findings of substantial changed circumstances. In short, it was the
application of the newly defined and clarified custody/visitation terms that resulted in
needing to adjust child support. The court quantified the percentages of visitation based
on the mediated agreement of the parties and based on the fact that Petitioner would have
the children more than 25% of the nights, the court found it appropriate to adjust child
support and use a joint custody worksheet. Additional findings were also made, that there
were unforeseeably higher expenses being paid by Petitioner for the benefit of the children
in his home in addition to his payment of child support. These were certainly sufficient
findings to support the modification orders of the court in this matter and were not vague
or unclear.
III.

The Appellant Failed to Meet the Marshaling Requirements on Appeal.
This Court has stated on many occasions that a critical requirement of

appellate advocacy is the duty of the Appellant to marshal the evidence when challenging
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the trial court's findings of fact. Respondent herein made no effort to marshal the evidence
in the case. As set forth in the preceding argument section, the trial court made clear and
sufficient findings of fact to support the modification of child support. None of these are
referenced in the Respondent's brief and he has thus failed to meet the marshaling
requirement. All Respondent provides in his brief are conclusory allegations that the trial
court's findings were insufficient. Given a review of the rulings in this case, both a
transcript of trial and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, it is clear that the trial
court in fact made sufficient and specific findings on all material elements.
In the recent case of Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the
Court found on appeal that Mr. Moon had simply reargued his own evidence and because
he failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court
had to assume that the record supported the findings of the trial court. Similarly, in this
case, the failure to marshal the evidence must also lead to this Court of Appeals to affirm
the findings of the trial court as complete and correct, for purposes of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly applied the child support statutes in this case and correctly
followed the controlling law in this matter. Given the material change in circumstances
which occurred when for the first time, the visitation schedule was quantified resulting in
over 25% of the nights for Petitioner, the trial court was mandated to calculate child
support based on a joint physical custody worksheet.
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The trial court did not misunderstand the standard for support modification or
misapply the standard. The child support guidelines sets forth a clear procedure for
modification which was followed in this case and all elements of that procedure were
correctly met. For these reasons, it is appropriate that the trial court order be affirmed in
all respects and this appeal denied as there has been no abuse of discretion established
herein.
Respectfully submitted this ? / day of

//goMCU^

2000.

LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

Suzanne Marelius
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7834
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A-15

78-45-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection
78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services.
(3) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(4) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table"
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14.
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and
a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated 'from earning a living
and is without sufficient means.
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile court, or administrative
agency which may enter a child support order as defined iir Section
62A-11-401.
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension
or retirement programs, or insurance policies of ajiy type. Earnings
specifically includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support guidelines in Sections 78-457.2 through 78-45-7.21.
(9) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
601 et seq.
(10) "Joint physical custody" means the child-stays with each parent
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and.both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.
(11) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related
insurance costs. (12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed.
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services.
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a
stepparent.
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at
least one of the children.
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(17) "State" includes any state, territory, or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or
adoptive parent or a person living with the natural or adoptive parent as
a common law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in
this state under Section 30-1-4 5 or m any other state which recognizes the
validity of common law marriages
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs
for up to a full-time work week or training schedule as necessitated by the
employment or training oLthe custodial parent under Section 78-45-7 17
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base
child support award
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch. section (4) inserted "base child support obhga
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1; 1989, ch. 214, § 2; tion table," "low income table," and "appropn
1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1994, ch. 118, § 1; 1994, ate", in Subsection (8), substituted "78-45-7 21"
ch. 140, § 13.
for "78-45-7 18", deleted former Subsection (15)
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- which defined "total child support award", and
ment by ch 140, effective May 2, 1994, added made stylistic changes
the definition of "office" and redesignated the
This section is set out as reconciled by the
other subsections accordingly
Office of Legislative Research and General
The 1994 amendment by ch 118, effective Counsel
Federal Law. - Title IV-D of the federal
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (2), (6), (9),
(11), and (20) and redesignated the remaining Social Security Act is codified as 42 U S C
subsections accordingly, in Subsection (3), in- § 651 et seq
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
serted "that may be ordered and is" and deleted
"uninsured" before "medical expenses", m Sub- of this title
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint physical custody
Cited
Joint physical custody.
Court-ordered visitation that included a total
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus additional visitation days, exceeded the threshold
for joint physical custody under Subsection (10)

and, thus, the court was required to follow the
mandate of the child support guidelines and
use the joint custody child support worksheet
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation
Udy v Udy, 893 P2d 1097 (Utah Ct App 1995)
Cited m Jeffenes v Jeffenes, 752 P2d 909
(Utah Ct App 1988), Asper v Asper, 753 P2d
978 (Utah Ct App 1988), Ball v Peterson, 912
P2d 1006 (Utah Ct App 1996)
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78-45-7,2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or
permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before
determining the award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a
decrease in the award.
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition
the court to adjust the amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether
there is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that
would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or
more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary
for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b).
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-7.2

(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a
substantial change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealthror assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the incomfe of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent
for the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support
ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (&)
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after
July 1, 1997.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, e n a c t e d by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, c h . 100, 5 3; 1990,
ch. 275, $ 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, c h . 232,
§ 72.

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s , — The 1997 amendment, effective July W 9 9 7 rewrote Subsection
(6) and added Subsections (7) and (8).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
C i t e d m Bnnkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d
113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Application of child-support guidelines to cases of joint-, split-, or similar sharedcustody arrangements, 57 A.L.R.5th 389.
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78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support
where justice requires.
ffistory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 8.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
*****

TYLER DARAN BOYCE
PLAINTIFF,
TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

VS .
TAMMY LINGE BOYCE

CASE NO#

964701453

DEFENDANT,

*****

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON
REGULARLY FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M.
MEMMOTT, SITTING AT FARMINGTON ON THE 20TH OF APRIL,
1999 .

APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

SUZANNE MARELIUS

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

D. MICHEAL

NIELSEN

COPY
REPORTED/TRANSCRIBED

BY

/K

JOANNE PRATT, CSR
800 WEST STATE STREET
FARMINGTON, UT
84 02 5
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APRIL 20, 1999
THE COURT:
FOLLOWING FINDINGS.

THE COURT WILL MAKE THE
THAT AT THE HEARING AT THE

TRIAL AND EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT HEARD,

EVIDENCE

THAT THEY WERE NOT -- THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO JOINT
PHYSICAL AND LEGAL CUSTODY.

THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN

ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE VISITATION SCHEDULE.
COURT FOUND A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

THAT THE

IN THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISITATION SCHEDULE.

THE

COURT FOUND, BASED ON THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THE
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE COURT HAD FOUND BASED
ON THE LIBERAL VISITATION SCHEDULE, THAT THE
APPROPRIATE CUSTODY OR CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE WAS
THE JOINT CUSTODY.

AND DOING THAT BASED ON FURTHER

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT FOUND
THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS THAT SHE NOT WORK
AND THEREFORE THE COURT -- WITH THE

PREVIOUS

SCHEDULE SHE HAD WORKED FULL-TIME THE COURT FOUND
SHE WAS NOT WORKING AND IT WAS IN THE BEST

INTERESTS

OF BOTH HER AND THE CHILDREN TO STAY AT HOME AND
THEREFORE, THE COURT IMPUTED NO INCOME IN THE
DETERMINATION OF HER SCHEDULE.

AND I BELIEVE THAT

THAT WAS THE RULING OF THE COURT.
BELIEVE

I DON'T

-- I WOULD GUESS THAT THE BASIS OF THIS
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THERE IS A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IF THERE'S AN
ERROR AT LAW.

AND WHILE YOU'VE CHARACTERIZED

AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
MR. NIELSEN:

NO.

THIS

--

IT'S A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OR A NEW TRIAL.
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND.

I'M SAYING I

WOULD ASSUME YOU HAVE DONE THIS THAT THERE HAS BEEN
AN ERROR OF LAW.

BASED ON THE UDY DECISION WHICH I

USED AND WHICH THE COURT INDICATED THAT ONCE -HOWEVER YOU DETERMINE IT, ONCE THIS VISITATION
SCHEDULE IS DONE, WHAT THE APPELLATE COURT

INDICATED

IS THAT I WAS REQUIRED TO USE THIS SCHEDULE FOR
DETERMINING SUPPORT.

AND I BELEVE THAT WHAT THIS

COURT DID IN DOING THAT WAS FOLLOW THAT DECISION..
AND IF I DIDN'T CORRECTLY FOLLOW IT, THEN I GUESS
IT'S GOING TO BE A BASIS FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO
SAY THAT I DIDN'T FOLLOW IT CORRECTLY BECAUSE THE
ATTEMPT OF THIS COURT WAS TO FOLLOW THE LAW AS SET
FORTH IN THAT DECISION.
MR. NIELSEN: THE ONLY COMMENT I HAVE,
JUDGE, AND IS THE COURT AWARE UDY VERSUS UDY WAS NOT
A MODIFICATION.

IT'S A CASE OF FIRST

THE COURT:
MR. NIELSEN:
THE COURT:

IMPRESSION.

UH-HUH.
OKAY.

THANK YOU.

AND THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL
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DENY THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
MR. NIELSEN:

YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT'S

GOING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES, I'LL NEED TO SPEAK TO IT.
THE COURT:

WHY DON'T YOU

SPEAK TO IT.

MR. NIELSEN: WHEN THE FIRST ORDER WAS
SUBMITTED BY MISS MARELIUS, IT HAD MANY THINGS THAT
WHILE A GOOD IDEA, WERE NOT IN THE TRIAL.
REFRESH THE COURT'S MEMORY.

LET ME

WE HAD A TELEPHONIC

CONFERENCE ABOUT THAT.
THE COURT:

I DO.

MR. NIELSEN: AND YES, MY DEMEANOR HAS BEEN
INAPPROPRIATE

IN THE CASE AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT.

BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THAT'S APPROPRIATE

EITHER

FOR MISS MARELIUS TO DO JUST BECAUSE WE THINK THAT'S
A GOOD IDEA.

IF IT WASN'T PART OF THE COURT'S

RULING, IT SHOULDN'T BE IN THE HEARING.
SHOULDN'T BE IN THE ORDER.

IT

IT SHOULD EVEN BE

DRAFTED AS A STIPULATION AND SENT TO THE OTHER
ATTORNEY, SIGNED AND SUBMITTED AND IT WASN'T, SO THE
COURT EVENTUALLY STRUCK ALL THAT.
WHAT I'M

IN OTHER WORDS,

SAYING IS, I PREVAILED ON MY MOTION IN

OPPOSITION TO HER -- MY OBJECTION TO HER ORDER.
WILL ADMIT WE BOTH EXPENDED ATTORNEYS FEES

PLACING

THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, BUT I THINK IT'S A

/4-T
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I

VALID CONCERN, JUDGE.

AND I REALLY WANTED TO HEAR

WHERE THE COURT WAS COMING FROM TO SATISFY MY
CLIENT, MYSELF AND TO MAKE THE DECISIONS AS TO WHAT
WE DO IN THE FUTURE.
SEE, IT REALLY ISN'T A PROBLEM RIGHT NOW
BECAUSE YOU ARE RIGHT.

SHE DOESN'T WORK.

BUT YOUR

HONOR, IN FIVE YEARS -- THIS IS A YOUNG CHILD.
GOT A LOT OF YEARS OF CHILD SUPPORT LEFT.

WE

IN FIVE

YEARS WHEN SHE MAKES PRETTY WELL EQUAL MONEY OR EVEN
15 OR 20 -- SHE'S A SCHOOL TEACHER.

WHEN SHE GOES

BACK TO THAT, CHILD SUPPORT DROPS TO ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S DECISION.

AND SO I

BELIEVE IT WAS A VALID CONCERN AND I APOLOGIZE FOR
DEMEANOR BUT NOT FOR CONTENT.

I THINK IT NEEDED TO

BE HEARD AND I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S

EXPLANATIONS

TO US .
MS. MARELIUS: WELL, JUST AS TO WHETHER OR
NOT IT WAS -- THE MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE ORDER
WERE CORRECT OR NOT, I STILL I THINK THEY WERE.
FACT I KNOW.

IN

I'VE BEEN IN THIS CASE SINCE THE

BEGINNING AND THEY WERE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL.

IT'S

TRUE THAT THE TRANSCRIPT DOESN'T SAY THE PARTIES
AGREE IN MEDIATION TO THESE.

AND IT'S

TERMS WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, A DISPUTE
MECHANISM.

PARENTING

RESOLUTION

SOME OF THE PARENTING CONTENT THAT THEY

fi-to
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DID AT MEDIATION.

AND IT WAS NOT RECITED AT TRIAL

AND I GUESS THAT WAS AN ERROR.
AGREED TO IT AT THE PRETRIAL.

MR. CATHCART AND I
SO IT REALLY WASN'T

EVEN IN OUR MINDS AT TRIAL AND I BELIEVE IT WAS
FULLY DISCUSSED AND AGREED BY THE PARTIES.

I THINK

IT'S SIGNIFICANT THAT THE TRIAL WAS JULY 13.

THE

OBJECTIONS BY MR. NIELSEN WERE -- AND THE FINDINGS
AND ORDER WERE DONE FIVE DAYS LATER AND THEN ON THE
18TH THESE VAGUE OBJECTIONS WERE FILED.

WE HAD A

PHONE CONFERENCE OCTOBER 19 WHERE ONLY ONE WORD WAS
CHANGED IN ALL OF THAT CONTENT.

AND WE AGREED TO

MAKING SOMETHING MUTUAL AS FAR AS
EXCHANGE, I BELIEVE.

INFORMATION

AND THEN THIS MOTION TO

RECONSIDER CAME A MONTH LATER.

SO I FRANKLY THINK

IT'S A PRETTY SLIM READ WHEN IT COMES TO THE

ISSUING

OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO SAY THAT OBJECTION WAS SO
MEANINGFUL WHEN ALL OF OUR TIME, 90 PERCENT OF THE
TIME, HAS BEEN ON THIS RESPONSE AND THE MOTION TO
RECONSIDER.
MR. NIELSEN:
REPRESENTATION.
NOT ONE.
THAT.

AND I'M

AND THAT'S NOT A CORRECT

ENTIRE PARAGRAPHS WERE STRICKEN,
SORRY THAT WE HAD TO GO THROUGH

AND I MAKE NO APOLOGY FOR THE MOTION TO

RECONSIDER.

I THINK IT'S VALID.

BY THE WAY, JUDGE,

JUST FOR THE RECORD, IT IS NOT JUST A MOTION TO
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RECONSIDER.

IT'S A MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR FOR A

NEW TRIAL BECAUSE SUZANNE'S RIGHT.
THING AS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER.
THINK THERE WAS.

THERE'S NO SUCH
WE'D ALL LIKE TO

BUT IT'S FOR A NEW TRIAL.

THE COURT:

ONE OF THE THINGS AS A NEW

TRIAL, ONE OF THE THINGS THAT CONCERNS ME IS THE
EVIDENCE, I GUESS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AT
THE NEW TRIAL FOR THE STATE.
WASN'T REALLY PRESENTED.

(UNINTELLIGIBLE)

I MEAN, THERE WAS THE ONE

LETTER, AFFIDAVIT, BUT THERE WASN'T REALLY
PRESENTED OF WHAT WOULD BE PRESENTED
TRIAL.

THAT

EVIDENCE

IF WE HAD A NEW

SO REALLY IT WAS TREATED IN TERMS OF

PLEADING MORE AS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER THAN IT WAS
A MOTION FOR NEW RETRIAL BASED ON THE EVIDENCE THAT
WAS SUBMITTED WITH.

THE COURT IS GOING TO DENY THE

MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.
DIFFICULT CASE.

I'M NOT SURE

I THINK THIS HAS BEEN A
(UNINTELLIGIBLE)

I DO

HAVE SOME CONCERNS THE WAY IT'S BEEN HANDLED, BUT
I'M NOT GOING TO (UNINTELLIGIBLE).
MR. NIELSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

MAYBE

SHOULD I DRAFT AND SUBMIT AN ORDER FOR THE COURT.
MS. MARELIUS:

I'D BE GLAD TO.

MR. NIELSEN: ONLY THING I'D ASK THAT IT SAY
MOTION TO RECONSIDERR OR A NEW TRIAL SO THAT THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL IS PRESERVED IN CASE MY CLIENT
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DECIDES ON THAT.

I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S

WITH ME AND COUNSEL TOO.
(PROCEEDINGS

CONCLUDED)
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PATIENCE

CERTIFICATE.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF DAVIS)

SS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE
FOREGOING

%

PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT TRANSCRIBED FROM

VIDEOTAPE CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF
THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND
ABILITY AS A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

IN AND FOR

THE STATE OF UTAH.

DATED AT FARMINGTON, UTAH T H I S / © DAY
OF

TT

1999 .
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SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081)
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
Facsimile: (801)575-7834

JUN 25

II 46 Aii '99

Lf>

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TYLER BOYCE,

|
I
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
j RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

{

TAMMY L. GOBLE,

\
|
I
!

Defendant.

Case No.: 964701453 DA
Judge: Jon M. Memmott

ooOoo
The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial came before the Court on
April 20, 1999 before the Honorable Jon Memmott presiding. Plaintiff was present in person
and represented by Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by
counsel Michael Nielsen. The Court heard argument, reviewed the record and file herein and
made the following findings and ruling:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is denied.

2.

The Court finds that at the time of trial herein July 31, 1998 the Court heard

evidence that the parties agreed in their original divorce stipulation to joint legal and joint
physical custody of their minor children and liberal visitation. The Court found that since entry
1
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of the Decree there have been substantial, material changes in circumstances wherein the parties
were unable to agree on a visitation schedule and that both parties filed petitions to modify
stating that the joint custody terms of the Decree were unworkable. At trial, the Court found
that the parties had resolved many disputes in mediation and through the temporary orders of
the Court including having agreed to continue the joint legal and joint physical custody of their
children and having agreed on a visitation schedule awarding to Plaintiff Tyler Boyce 37% of
the time with the children, and Defendant having 63% of the time with the children. Based on
the new visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, the Court deemed it appropriate that
the parties use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate the amount of future child support.
3.

Further, at the time of trial, the Court learned through testimony that Mrs. Goble,

the Defendant was not working full-time having previously been a school teacher and was
currently staying home with the children. Based on that change, the Court sua sponte deemed
it appropriate that zero income be imputed to Defendant for purposes of calculating child
support.
4.

The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion for attorneys fees and finds that

although Defendant did not really present evidence in her Motion which would have been
considered in a new trial, that both parties reasonably incurred fees for the post-trial motions and
each should bear their own costs and fees.
DATED this iSh -frrflof

, 1999.

"3IA/V^

BY THE COURT:
Approval^ to Farm:

/

^ fr^Nr
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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